| PROPERTY-POOR DISTRICT | PROPERTY-WEALTHY DISTRICT |
|---|
Bottom quintile, California Median assessed value ~$525,000 / pupil | Top quintile, California Median assessed value ~$4.1 million / pupil |
To raise $500 per student each year, it must tax property at: $95 per $100,000 of assessed value | To raise $500 per student each year, it taxes property at only: $12 per $100,000 of assessed value |
At the CA bond rate cap ($60 / $100,000), it raises only: $315 per student / year | At the CA bond rate cap ($60 / $100,000), it raises: $2,460 per student / year |
The result is that school facility quality is often closely tied to a community’s property wealth—a pattern that has driven legal challenges in multiple states and continues to shape reform conversations nationwide.
State funding can serve as an equalizing force when designed with an eye toward addressing these funding capacity gaps. Twenty-eight states incorporate an explicit adjustment for local wealth into their capital funding formulas, typically by providing higher state shares of project funding or priority placement for lower-wealth districts.
The mechanisms for this vary considerably:
- Ohio ranks districts based on the least property and income wealth per pupil and works down the list in order.
- Colorado uses a blind review process that scores project severity and then determines state matching rates based on 7 indicators of district wealth, with the state share ranging from 15 to more than 80 percent of project costs.
- Minnesota offers several overlapping programs—including a Long-term Facilities Maintenance Program, a Debt Service Equalization program, and a Maximum Effort School Aid Law—that together provide multiple pathways for capital support for districts with limited tax bases.
- Kansas allocates state aid to districts with an amount per pupil that is determined by the district’s assessed value per pupil (AVPP); if a district’s AVPP is above a certain threshold, the state aid is reduced by 1% for every $1,000 increase in AVPP and increases by the same rate below the threshold.
Approaches that address local wealth disparities matter. Research from the Urban Institute finds that nationally, students from low-income backgrounds are more likely than other students to attend schools in need of major repairs. States with local wealth adjustment provisions in their capital funding formulas are significantly more likely to show progressive capital spending patterns—meaning districts serving more low-income students spend more per pupil on facilities, rather than less.
Three states provide policy frameworks for prioritizing local wealth adjustments:
Massachusetts: A dedicated authority
Massachusetts offers one of the clearest examples of what a well-designed state capital finance system can look like. Before 2004, the state reimbursed a share of local construction costs through annual appropriations (via the School Building Assistance Commission), but the program was volatile and had accumulated a substantial backlog of unfunded projects.
In 2004, the state established the Massachusetts School Building Authority (MSBA), a quasi-independent authority financed by a dedicated share of the state sales tax. Critically, the MSBA operates outside the annual appropriations process, insulating school construction from year-to-year budget competition. The MSBA runs a competitive grant program with a tiered matching formula: districts with lower property wealth and income receive higher state shares, with the state covering as much as 80 percent of approved project costs for the neediest communities.
The MSBA model also illustrates the connection between institutional design and distributional outcomes. Because projects are competitively reviewed against clear criteria and wealth-conditioned, the program tends to direct resources where they are most needed. Massachusetts’ approach has been widely cited as a model by reformers in other states.
While the MSBA model has merit for targeting funding to local need, its statewide impact is limited because the program is funded only at a level that supports aid to a small percentage of projects each year.
See the Massachusetts State Policy Profile for more details.
Ohio: Court-driven reform and a wealth-ranked list
Ohio’s current school capital finance system exists largely because the courts forced it. In DeRolph v. State (decided in 1997, revisited through 2002), the Ohio Supreme Court found that the state’s school funding system—including its approach to facilities—was constitutionally inadequate. The litigation produced a series of remedial orders that ultimately led to the creation of what is now the Ohio Facilities Construction Commission (OFCC).
The OFCC administers the state’s capital construction program using a wealth ranking: districts are ranked by a composite measure of property and income wealth per pupil, and state funding is allocated in rank order beginning with the least-wealthy districts. The state’s share of project costs is also wealth-conditioned, so the poorest districts receive the highest proportional state support. The OFCC also enforces construction standards and oversees district master planning requirements.
Ohio’s approach illustrates both the power and the limitations of litigation as a reform mechanism. The DeRolph decisions did produce a dedicated agency and a wealth-ranked allocation process. But the program remains significantly underfunded relative to statewide need, and districts at the bottom of the list may wait years before reaching the top.
See the Ohio State Policy Profile for more details.
Maine: State debt service support prioritized by facility need
Maine’s Major Capital School Construction Program may cover 100 percent of approved school construction costs, but without an explicit wealth-conditioning formula. Projects are reviewed and prioritized by the State Board of Education’s School Construction Committee, which issues Certificates of Approval defining the scope and the state’s share of debt service. Maine supports school construction by paying a share of the debt on approved projects. Districts apply during periodic rating cycles, and the Department of Education scores each project on building condition, crowding, and program needs. Projects that make the State Board’s priority list receive a Certificate of Approval that sets the state’s share of debt service. Unlike the wealth-based approaches in Ohio or Colorado, Maine’s rating system does not consider local property wealth. Access depends on facility need, not on a district’s own bonding capacity. This model effectively decouples school construction access from local property wealth—any district that successfully navigates the approval and prioritization process can receive state funding for 100 percent of costs.
The trade-off is scarcity. No dedicated revenue source exists, so how many projects move forward depends on biennial appropriations: in the 2017–18 cycle, only 9 of 74 applications were approved. And because the state pays its share through the general school funding formula, this support does not appear in federal capital revenue data, which is why Maine shows as 0% in Figure 1. Maine has a significant aging school building stock, and a recent Governor’s Commission on School Construction (2024-2025) studied the adequacy of the current program’s funding levels.
See the Maine State Policy Profile for more details.